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Compulsory Fingerprinting and the Self-Incrimination Privilege
It must be surprising to the public, which has become aware of
the extensive fingerprint systems maintained by the FBI and by
many municipal police departments, that the propriety of taking an
accused person's fingerprints against his will and using them as
evidence at the trial is not a closed question. No doubt there are
very few defense lawyers who would, at this time, appeal solely on
this ground, but occasionally an appellate court must face the question when presented as a subsidiary reason for reversal. Such was
the situation in the recent case of State v. Watson,' where the defendant claimed, among other things, that his fingerprints had been
taken without his consent, and that this violated the right against
self-incrimination guaranteed him by the federal2 and state3 Constitutions. In arguing the case, however, defendant's counsel succeeded in persuading the court that taking a person's fingerprints
was analogous to, and should be governed by the rules relating to
confessions. This made it necessary for the court to find that the
"confession" (i.e., the fingerprints) was given "voluntarily" and in
this it had difficulty, because the defendant only had the intelligence
of an eight-year-old child. The court was also forced to consider
whether the defendant had been warned that the prints might be
used against him, and whether any threats or promises had been
made to him at the time the fingerprints were taken. 4 After much
adroit maneuvering, the court found the act "voluntary," and affirmed the conviction.
An elementary analysis of the problem would have spared the
court most of its difficulty. The idea that there is an analogy between taking one's fingerprints and obtaining a confession may be
dismissed immediately. A confession, according to Dean Wigmore's
definition, is "an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused
in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some
essential part of it."5 The conclusion that taking an accused person's fingerprints is not within this principle is fully justified by a
consideration of the purpose of the rule. A confession is excluded
only when it can be shown that it was made as a result of a promise
of some benefit, or threat of harm, either of which might induce
the accused person to make an untrue confession. But if the circumstances indicate that the confession is true, the confession prin' -Vt.-,

49 Atl. (2d) 174 (1946).

U.S. Const. Amend. V.
3 Constitution of Vermont, Art. 10, Ch. 1.
4 Supra note 1 at p. 178.
5 Wigmore, Treatise on Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940) §821. For cases supporting this definition, see Ballew v. U.S., 160 U.S. 187 (1895) ; People
v. Savage, 358 Ill. 518, 193 N.E. 470 (1934) ; People v. Porter, 269 Mich.
2

284, 257 N.W. 705 (1934).
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ciple interposes no obstacle. In other words, threats and promises
are important only because they indicate that the confession may be
just a "way out" that the accused has taken, rather than a true
statement of the facts. 6 It is obvious, then, that fingerprints, which
are unquestionably accurate, cannot come within the confession rule.
The court apparently treated as synonymous with the confession
rule the objection that admission of fingerprints violated the defendant's right not to be required to give evidence against himself:
the privilege against self incrimination.7 This error is frequently
made, despite the fact that the two doctrines arose over 100 years
apart and are governed by differing limitations. Indeed "the sole
relationship between the confession rule and the privilege [against
self-incrimination] is to be found in the general spirit and caution
which the law gradually developed in the interest of accused persons."'8 How far does the privilege go in protecting an accused
person? Should it prevent admission in evidence of a person's fingerprints taken against his will? The privilege was evolved and became
ingrained in our law during the bitter days of the Courts of Star
Chamber and High Commission in England and of the Inquisition
on the continent. It was a popular reaction to the practice of putting a person on oath before a tribunal and requiring that he answer
as to matters which might subject him to criminal punishment, 9
and was unquestionably of the greatest benefit in protecting individual liberty at the time. It should be noted at this point, however,
that the privilege is directed only at testimonial compulsion-forcing from a person's lips self-incriminating assertions-and has no
application when no attempt is being made to require him to testify
as a witness.' 0
In applying the policy of the privilege against self-incrimination,
as indicated by its history, to the problem of introducing a person's fingerprints into evidence, three questions might be asked:
(1) Is there any longer any justification for the privilege at all?
(2) Is compulsory fingerprinting within the letter of the privilege?
(3) Is it within the policy of the privilege? First, it could well be
argued that the reasons which justified a protection of individuals
against compulsory self-incrimination no longer exist; that inquisitions and star-chamber methods are now merely subjects for
judicial rhetoric, and that for this reason the privilege should be
abolished. Two observations negative this argument, however. One
is that the privilege is contained in the Constitutions of the federal
government and 46 of the 48 states and as a practical matter would
be impossible to abolish. The other reason is that, according to
Wigmore, its abolition would tempt prosecutors to become slack in
6 Wigrore, supra note 5, §822.
7
Supra, note 1 at p. 177.
8 Inbau, Self-Incrimination-What Can An Accused Person Be Compelled To Do? (1937) 28 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 261, at 263. The history of the privilege against self-incrimination is exhaustively treated in
Wigmore, Evidence, supra note 5, §2250. Upon the issue of possible
kinship between the confession rule and the privilege against self-incrimination, see McCormick, C. T., "The Scope of Privilege in the Law of
Evidence," 16 Texas L. Rev. 447 at pp. 452-457 (1938).
9 Ibid.
10 Another type of testimonial compulsion which is protected against
by the privilege is the right not to have to produce self-incriminating
documents in response to subpoena or other process. Inbau, supra note 8,
p. 263.
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procuring ample evidence." As a British official in India put it,
"There is a great deal of laziness to'it. It is far pleasanter to sit
comfortably in the shade, rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's
eyes, than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence."' 12 But if it
is kept in mind that today the sole supporting policy of the privilege
is to prevent indolence on the part of prosecutors, and that it enables
many guilty criminals to go free for want of other evidence, it must
be concluded that the privilege should be severely restricted and
should be applied only when it will fulfill its present day reason for
existence.
Secondly, the use of fingerprints as evidence does not violate the
express provisions of the self-incrimination privilege for two reasons. The privilege is designed to prevent a court from requiring
that a defendant make statements or do acts that will "tend to
incriminate him." But in the case of fingerprints, the accused person is not "testifying as a witness" nor "delivering any testimonial
utterance."'13 The distinction was enunciated by Mr. Justice Holmes
in Holt v. United States14 as follows: ". . . the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is
a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material." It can hardly be claimed that taking
one's fingerprints involves a testimonial act on his part, but this is
the only kind of act to which the privilege applies. A second, and
perhaps less satisfactory reason that the privilege does not apply
here, is that when one's fingerprints are taken, there is no compulsion exercised. As one court has put it, 1' "No volition-that is, no
act of willing-on the part of the mind of the defendant is required.
Fingerprints of an unconscious person, or even of a dead person are
as accurate as are those of the living. . . . The witness does not
testify. The physical facts speak for themselves; no fears, no hopes,
no will of the prisoner to falsify or to exaggerate could produce or
create a resemblance of her fingerprints or change them in one line,
and therefore there is no danger of error being committed or untruth told."
Thirdly, the policy of the privilege is not violated by admission
of fingerprints. Even assuming that its present purpose is to safeguard against inquisitorial methods of prosecution, it can hardly
be said that taking one's fingerprints, which is merely a method of
identification, is one of the kind of practices which this privilege
was designed to prevent. If we accept Dean Wigmore's more realistic
theory, that the privilege is useful now only to prevent official negligence in actually solving crimes, it is apparent that this policy is
being defeated, rather than aided, by the present application of the
self-incrimination principle. As a practical matter, courts have
been almost unanimous in refusing to sanction any defense based
on the privilege in analogous cases where an accused person is forced
to put his foot into a footprint known to have been made by the
11 Wigmore, supra note 5, §2251.

12 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law, p. 442 (1883).
13 Magee v. State, 92 Miss. 865, 46 So. 529 (1908).
14 218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910).

15 People v. Sallow, 165 N.Y.S., 915 (1917).
412 (1918) and 17 Col. L. Rev. 633 (1917).

See notes in 27 Yale L. J.
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criminal, 16 or to submit to an examination of his body for scars
or wounds, 17 or to submit to a mental examination,' 8 or is required
:o stand up in court to be identified by a witness. 19 In the relatively
few cases where fingerprints were claimed to be self-incriminatory,
most courts have denied the privilege as a defense.2 0 But several
courts, including the Vermont court in the principal case, have indicated that privilege is violated unless the fingerprints are given
voluntarily.2 1 It should be noted, however, that in the latter cases,
the prints were found to have been given voluntarily, so it is possible
to say, first, that the statements were dicta, since not necessary to
a decision of the case, and second, that the standards as to what is
"voluntary" have been materially altered to meet the practical requirements of the situation.
A reinvestigation of the self-incrimination privilege, its history
and present day purposes, plus a practical approach to the every day
necessities of law enforcement seem to justify the conclusion that
there is no valid reason why fingerprints taken by compulsion should
come within the privilege. Although the court in State v. Watson
arrived at a proper result, it did so only after spending several pages
considering matters which were not only unnecessary, but simply
clouded the issue, and created other obstacles which the court was
hard pressed to overcome.
Arthur R. Seder, Jr.
16 State v. Barela, 23 N.M. 395, 168 Pac. 545 (1917) ; State v. Graham,
74 N.C. 646 (1876).
17 State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79 (1879) ; State v. Struble, 71 Iowa 11,
32 N.W. 1 (1887).
Is People v. Truck, 170 N.Y. 203, 63 N.E. 281 (1902) ; State v. Eastwood, 73 Vt. 205, 50 Atl. 1077 (1901). This is probably the hardest situation that must be faced in connection with the privilege against selfincrimination, since there is testimonial compulsion of a sort. Faced with
the practical necessity of allowing these examinations, however, courts
have permitted them, but have avoided a straightforward holding that the
privilege does not apply.
19 People v. Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119, 38 N.E. 1003 (1894); State v.
Reasby, 100 Iowa 231, 69 N.W. 451 (1896); Commonwealth v. Safis, 122
Pa. Super. 333, 186 Atl. 177 (1936).
20 People v. Sallow, 165 N.Y.S. 915 (1917) is the leading case. Also
see United States v. Kelly, 55 Fed. (2d) 67 (CCA 2nd 1932) where a
realistic approach is taken.
21 People v. Hevern, 215 N.Y.S. 412 (1926) ; People v. Les, 267 Mich.
648, 255 N.W. 407 (1934) where the judge writing the opinion gave as
his opinion that introduction of fingerprints violated no fundamental
right, but since the jury had found that the prints were given voluntarily, the point was expressly reserved. The dictum in State v. Cerciello,
86 N.J.L. 309, 90 Atl. 1112 (1914) that taking of fingerprints without
the accused person's consent violated the self-incrimination privilege was
repudiated in Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N.J.Eq. 141, 152 Atl. 17 (1930).

